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WORLD LAW:
In 1946, the Senate passed a resolution proposing that the United
States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in a limited category of legal disputes.' Acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction had received the support of many organizations,
including the American Bar Association. The House of Delegates of
the Association considered a proposal favoring acceptance in December,
1945, and adopted it unanimously.2 "The ultimate purpose of the reso-
lution," according to the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, was "to lead to general world-wide acceptance of the jurisdiction"
of the Court and, thus, "in a substantial sense, place international rela-
tions on a legal basis, in contrast to the present situation, in which states
may be their own judge of the law."'
As finally adopted, however, the resolution recommended that the
United States reserve from its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
"disputes with regard to matters which are essentiallj within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United
States."'4  The italicized phrase did not appear in the original resolution
introduced by Senator Wayne Morse. In fact, the Foreign Relations
Committee had considered and unanimously rejected such an amend-
ment to the resolution on the ground that "the question of what is prop-
erly a matter of international law is . . -. appropriate for decision by
the Court itself, since, if it were left to the decision of each individual
state, it would be possible to withhold any case from adjudication on
the plea that it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction."' The amendment
was, nevertheless, introduced during the Senate debate by Senator Tom
Connally, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and was
added to the Morse resolution by a vote of fifty-one to twelve.0
'The resolution was adopted by a vote of 6o to z. 92 CONG. REC. 1o7o6 (x946).
The categories of legal disputes to which the compulsory jurisdiction of the World
Court is limited are those enumerated in STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36, para. 2.
2 Hearings on S. Res. x96 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 7 9 th Cong., ad Sess. 47 (1946).
'S. REP. No. 1835, 7 9 th Cong., zd Sess. 3 (2946).
' 9 Z CONG. REC. 207o6 (1946) (Emphasis added).
'S. RP. No. 1835, 7 9 th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946).
a 92 CONG. REC. io697 (2946).
The Connally Amendment was subsequently incorporated in the
United States's declaration of acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction issued by the President on August 14, 1946.7 It has since
become known as the "self-judging reservation." The reservation has
recently been called the cause of "a general devaluation of the idea of
compulsory jurisdiction." ' It has also been assigned by Charles S.
Rhyne as the reason for "the empty courtroom" of the World Court.'
Since its organization in 1946, only four cases that the Court has decided
on the merits were instituted by invoking its compulsory jurisdiction.' 0
In only one case has the judgment of the Court turned upon a self-
judging reservation. That was the Norwegian Loans Case, decided in
1957, in which the Court held that Norway, which had no self-judging
reservation, could invoke the French reservation and thereby preclude
the Court from taking jurisdiction of the suit brought by France against
Norway. The importance of the decision is therefore clear.
The self-judging reservation has again become the subject of public
and senatorial attention in the United States. In, 1959 Senator Hubert
Humphrey introduced a resolution"- in the Senate to authorize submis-
sion of a new American declaration of acceptance of compulsory juris-
diction that would omit the phrase "as determined by the United
States." This bipartisan proposal has received the support of President
Eisenhower and other high government officials. Again, the American
Bar Association has declared its support of the Court and of the world
rule of law by urging the revision of the United States' acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction.' Moreover, it has now been recognized that
' 6i Stat. iziS, i U.N.T.S. 9 (1946).
8Sohn, International Tribunals: Past, Preserft and Fueture, 46 A.B.A.J. 23, 25
(1960).
8 105 CONG. REc. 4511 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1959) (Address by Mr. Rhyne, Chair-
man, Committee on World Peace through Law, American Bar Association, before the
ninth annual conference of national organizations called by American Association for
the United Nations, Statler Hotel, Washington, D.C., March zo, 1959.)
"8 Until April 12, i96o, the Court had decided only three compulsory jurisdiction
cases on the merits. Liacouras, Contentious Proceedings Before the International Court
of Justice, Dec. iI, i959, p. 66 (unpublished memorandum in Duke Law School World
Rule of Law Center). On the former date, the fourth such case was decided. Case
Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (merits), [i96o] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
" S. Res. 94, 86th Cong. ist Sess. (1959). Hearings were held on the resolution on
January z7 th and February 17th, i96o. Hearings on S. Res. 94 Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., zd Sess. (196o). On March 29, i96o,
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations decided, by a vote of 9 to 7, to postpone
further action on the resolution. io6 CONG. REc. D2 4 7 (daily ed. Mar. 29, i96o).
See N. Y. Times, Mar. 30, 196o, p. 17, col. 5.
"2N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 196o, p. xs, col. 1.
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the self-judging reservation is a serious obstacle to protection of Ameri-
can investments abroad, for so long as the reservation remains, the
United States has no hope of successfully invoking the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction against other countries.1 3 The editors believe that a
report of the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the
Norwegian Loans Case will provide the practitioner with an authorita-
tive legal background for this timely and important issue.
-The Editors
THE NORWEGIAN LOANS CASE*
B ETWEEN i885 and r909, the Norwegian government and two Nor-
wegian state banks1 issued several series of public bonds, many of which
were purchased by French citizens. During the unsettled years of
World War I and the world-wide depression a decade later, Norway
several times suspended the convertibility to gold of the Norwegian
bank notes issued to pay interest and to redeem the bonds, and, in 1931,
Norway abandoned the gold standard for an indefinite period.2 The
French bondholders refused to accept payment in the nonconvertible
Norwegian bank notes, and, in 1925, the French government, on behalf
of its nationals, insisted to the government of Norway that it was obli-
gated to pay the interest and to redeem the bonds in gold. The Nor-
wegian government consistently maintained, during ensuing protracted
diplomatic negotiations, that its law forbade payment in gold.3 More-
"3 "As matters pertaining to the treatment of American investments in foreign coun-
tries can easily be considered as being essentially within the jurisdiction of those countries,
any claims brought by the United States on behalf of injured American investors are
likely to founder on a rock of our own making [the self-judging reservation]." Sohn,
International Tribunals: Past, Present and Future, 4 6 A.B.A.J. 23, 25 (196o).
* Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.CJ. Rep. 9.
'The state banks were the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway and the
Norwegian Small Holding and Workers' Housing Bank.
'The convertibility of the banknotes to gold was still suspended in 1955 when
France made its application to the Court.
'The following Norwegian law came into force on December x5, 1923:
"Where a debtor has lawfully agreed to pay in gold a pecuniary debt in kroner and
where the creditor refuses to accept payment in Bank of Norway notes on the basis of
their nominal gold value, the debtor may request a postponement of payment for such
period as the Bank is exempted from its obligation to redeem its notes in accordance
with their nominal value. Where a creditor withdraws his refusal he shall be entitled
to require such payment only after the giving of three months' notice. During the
period of postponement interest shall be paid at the rate of four per cent per annum.
Interest shall be paid in banknotes in accordance with their nominal value.
'Prior notice of waiver of the right to request postponement may be given only by
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over, Norway rejected the repeated suggestions of France that the
dispute be submitted to international arbitration or judicial settlement
on the ground that the dispute was governed by Norwegian national
law rather than international law.
In 1955, France applied to the International Court of Justice for a
determination of the rights of its nationals. The application4 requested
judgment that Norway was obligated to pay gold on the bond coupons
and the bonds. In its preliminary objections, Norway challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court on three grounds:' (i) that the subject matter
of the dispute was in the domain of Norwegian national law rather than
international law; (2) that, with respect to bonds issued by the state
banks, those banks had separate legal personalities from the Norwegian
state, and that suit could not be instituted against Norway on those
bonds, and that the jurisdiction of the Court was limited to disputes
between states;6 and (3) that the French bontholders had not exhausted
local remedies available to them in the Norwegian courts. After hear-
ings on Norway's preliminary objections and on the merits, the Inter-
the State, municipalities, the Bank of Norway and the Banks which are fully guaranteed
by the State (the Mortgage Bank, the Small Holding and Workers' Housing Bank and
the Fishery Bank)." Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957] I. C. j. Rep. 9, x9.
'An application is the first document submitted by the complaining, or applicant,
state and it serves to institute the proceedings. It must indicate the subject of the dispute
and the parties. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 40, para. x. The application may be
thought of as the approximate equivalent of the complaint submitted to a federal district
court. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
'The grounds of the Norwegian challenge to the Court's jurisdiction, numbered
one, two, and three in the text, were submitted by Norway in its first, third, and fourth
preliminary objections, respectively. Norway's second preliminary objection, which was
abandoned before the oral proceedings, maintained that the facts out of which the
dispute arose had occurred prior to the French acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction. Because such disputes had been reserved from the French acceptance,
Norway claimed that, by virtue of the principle of reciprocity, the present dispute was
not within the Court's jurisdiction.
6 This objection was discussed by only two of the Judges. Judge Read, dissenting,
rejected the objection because the record showed clearly that the Norwegian state had
completely identified itself with the banks. In particular, Norway, in a suit instituted
in a French court by the bondholders against the Mortgage Bank, had submitted a cer-
tificate that the bank was an instrumentality of the Norwegian government. Judge Read
said,
"It is a sound doctrine that a party cannot blow both hot and cold at the same time, and
Norway cannot retreat from the position of complete identification taken in 1931, and
persisted in the proceedings before the French court, for the purpose of preventing this
Court from ajudicating upon the matter." [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 96.
Judge Lauterpacht, in his separate opinion, was content to observe that the objection
was not "well founded." Id. at 36.
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national Court of Justice held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
dispute and dismissed the French application.7
THE FRENCH SELF-JUDGING RESERVATION
The Court rested its judgment on Norway's first preliminary objec-
tion.8 Among the disputes which the Court may hear are those in-
volving questions of international law,' and it was on this basis that
France had submitted its application. In its first preliminary objection,
however, Norway maintained that the dispute pertained to questions
which were solely within the domain of national law. The Norwegian
government, therefore, invoked against France the following reservation
to the French declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the court:10
This declaration does not apply to differences relating to matters which are
essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the Government
of the French Republic.
"judgment of July 6, 1957. The Judges stood x to 3. The Court consisted of
President Hackworth; Vice President Badawi; Judges Guerrero, Basdevant, Winiarski,
Zori6i6 Klaestad, Read, Armand-Ugon, Kojevnikov, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Moreno Quintana, C6rdova, and Wellington Koo. Of the
majority, one Judge submitted a separate declaration and two others appended separate
opinions. Three dissenting opinions were also appended.
8 "Whereas:
i. The subject of the dispute, as defined in the Application of the French Government
of July 6th, 1955, is within the domain of muncipal [national] law and not of inter-
national law, whereas the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the Parties
involved is restricted, by their Declarations of November i6th, 1946, and March ist,
1949, to disputes concerning international lawi . . . 2" [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 13.
'The "legal disputes" which may be brought before the Court under its compulsory
jurisdiction are limited to:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an inter-
national obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
STAT. INT L CT. JusT. art. 36, para. z. The Court may also hear other cases which the
parties refer to it by special agreement and any other matters specially provided for in
the United Nations Charter or in treaties or conventions in force. Id. art. 36, para. x.
"0 [-957] I.C.J. Rep. at 23. On July io, 1959, France submitted a new declaration
of acceptance which substituted the following for the self-judging reservation: "(2)
disputes relating to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the
domestic jurisdiction,. " [958-1959] I.C.J.Y.B. 212; New Declarations of Ac-
ceptance by France and India of the Jurisdiction of the World Court fnder Article 36(2)
of Its Statute, z96o DUKE L.J. 84, 85.
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Thus, for the first time," the Court was presented with the significant
question whether a respondent state, which has made no self-judging
reservation in its declaration of acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction, may, nevertheless, invoke the self-judging reservation of
the applicant state and thereby preclude the Court from taking juris-
diction of the case. The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The opinion of the majority pointed out that the basis of the Court's
jurisdiction was article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and
the unilateral declarations of states accepting its compulsory jurisdic-
tion.'2 Norway had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
in relation to any other state on condition of reciprocity; that is, it had
accepted jurisdiction only to the same extent as any other state which
might become a party to a case in which Norway was involved. Thus,
because France had reserved from its acceptance all matters essentially
within its national jurisdiction, as understood by the French government,
the Court concluded that the extent of its jurisdiction in a dispute be-
tween Norway and France was bounded by the narrower limits of the
French declaration of acceptance.' 3  In accordance with the principle of
reciprocity, the Court ruled that Norway could invoke the self-judging
1 [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 60.
1"The Norwegian declaration, dated November x6, 1946, stated:
"I [Lange, Minister for Foreign Affairs] declare on behalf of the Norwegian Govern-
ment that Norway recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement,
in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that is to say, on condition
of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in conformity with
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, for a period of ten years as from
3rd October 1946."
The French declaration, dated March 1, 1949, stated:
"On behalf of the Government of the French Republic, and subject to ratification, I
[Bidault, Foreign Minister] declare that I recognize as compulsory ipso facto and with-
out special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that
is on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in
conformity with Article 36, paragraph z, of the Statute of the said Court, for all disputes
which may arise in respect of facts or situations subsequent to the ratification of the
present declaration, with the exception of those with regard to which the parties may
have agreed or may agree to have recourse to another method of peaceful settlement.
"This declaration does not apply to differences relating to matters which are essen-
tially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the Government of the French
Republic.
"The present declaration has been made for five years from the date of the deposit
of the instrument of ratification. It shall continue in force thereafter until notice to
the contrary is given by the French Government." Id. at zi.
" The Court relied on Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [195z] I.C.J. Rep. 93, 103;
Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 77, at Si (1939) 5 Phos-
phates in Morocco, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 74, at 22 (1938).
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reservation which France could have invoked if it had been the respond-
ent state. Thus, Norway's invocation of the French self-judging
reservation prevented the Court from assuming jurisdiction of the case.
The members of the majority who submitted separate opinions and
the three dissenting judges took issue with the Court's conclusion as to
jurisdiction. Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht"4 and Judge Guerrero "
conceived that the Court lacked jurisdiction of the dispute because the
French declaration of acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
was invalid. Vice President Badawil6 and Judges Lauterpacht and
Basdevant'- were of the opinion that Norway's invocation of the self-
judging reservation was subsidiary to its primary objection that the dis-
pute was governed by national law rather than international law and
concluded that the Court should not have reached a decision on the
subsidiary objection without first considering the primary objection.
Judge Read" felt that, although Norway was entitled to invoke the
French reservation, the Court should not have considered the question
because Norway had failed to maintain that position throughout the
proceeding.
VALIDITY OF THE FRENCH DECLARATION
Matters essentially within its national jurisdiction as understood by
its government were excepted by France from its declaration of accept-
ance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. "The great defect of
this reservation," said Judge Guerrero, "is that it does not conform
either to the spirit of the Statute of the Court . . . 2 9 or to its letter.
The majority of the Court, however, declined to consider the validity of
the French declaration because that had not been an issue in the
proceedings.20
1 [957] I.C.J. Rep. at 34-66 (separate opinion). Article 57 of the Statute of the
Court provides that, "If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate
opinion." The Court Reports, however, label as "separate opinions" only those opinions
which express agreement with the operative part of the judgment. Other opinions are
labelled "dissenting opinions." In addition, a Judge may make a "declaration" of his
position, which usually consists of one or two paragraphs only.
"Id. at 67-70 (dissenting opinion).
10 Id. at 29-33 (separate opinion).
lId. at 71-78 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 79-100 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 68.
"The Court stated that the self-judging reservation was "a provision which both
Parties to the dispute regard as constituting an expression of their common will relating
to the competence of the Court." Id. at 27. Inasmuch as the validity of the French
[Vol. i 96o: 4 16
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Judge Guerrero agreed with the majority that the extent of the
Court's jurisdiction was determined by the declarations of the parties to
the dispute and particularly by the more restrictive limits of the French
declaration containing the self-judging reservation. But, he pointed out,
this made it necessary for the Court to consider the validity of the
French declaration. Upon the authority of the Free Zones Case,2
Judge Guerrero decided that the consensus of the parties to the instant
case as to jurisdiction was binding upon the Court only so far as that
consensus was compatible with the Statute of the Court.
Judge Guerrero also believed that the French self-judging reserva-
tion was incompatible with the second paragraph of article 36 of the
Statute of the Court, which provides for acceptance of compulsory juris-
diction by the parties to the Statute.
By the fact that France reserves her right to determine herself the limit be-
tween her own national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Court, France
renders void her main undertaking, for the latter ceases to be compulsory if
it is France and not the Court that holds the power to determine the limit
'between their respective jurisdictions.22
Judge Guerrero felt that the self-judging reservation was also incom-
patible with article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute, which provides that
the Court shall be the judge of its own jurisdiction.
Judge Lauterpacht agreed on the latter point and noted that, al-
though the declarations of acceptance of the various states might limit
the Court's jurisdiction "in a drastic manner, '2 3 only the Court should
judge whether a dispute fell within whatever modicum of jurisdiction
remained. Because the Court could not act in any manner inconsistent
with its Statute, and because the French declaration of acceptance was
incompatible with the Statute, Judge Lauterpacht concluded that the
declaration was not questioned by either party, neither because of the self-judging reser-
vation nor on any other ground, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the
reservation.
. P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2z, at 13 (1929). The parties to that case had agreed that
the Court should unofficially communicate to them the result of its deliberations without
waiting for a formal judgment to be pronounced in open court. On its own motion,
however, the Court found that it could not act in accordance with the parties' agreement
because to do so would necessitate a. departure from the Statute of the Court. Stat.
Perm. Ct. Int'l Just. art. 58 (now STAT. INIT'L CT. JUST. art. 58). See also, South-
West Africa-Voting Procedure, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67, 76, in which the Court held
that it was legally impossible for the United Nations General Assembly to employ a
voting system "entirely alien to that prescribed by the Charter."
2' [.9s7] I.C.J. Rep. at 68.
23 Id. at 46.
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Court had no choice but to hold the French declaration completely
invalid.24 The Court would thus lack any jurisdiction over the dispute.
The" Judge thought his conclusion was analogous to the general prin-
ciple of national law that a condition of a contract or other legal instru-
ment that "is contrary to a fundamental principle of judicial organiza-
tion is invalid. ' 25  He rejected the notion that those governments which
had appended self-judging reservations to their declarations of accept-
ance26 had been unfamiliar with the terms of the Statute and that their
2 Judge Lauterpacht observed that, although "early writers considered that every
single provision of a treaty is indissolubly linked with the fate of the entire instrument,"
it is not the modern international judicial practice to regard treaties as necessarily in-
divisible. Id. at 56. Free Zones Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 22, at 140 (.929); Com-
petence of the International Labour Organisation, ser. B, No. 2, at 23, 24, and No. 3,
at is (1926) 5 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. i5. He
also noted that it would be consistent for the Court to uphold its jurisdiction if it were
at all possible to do so by treating the invalid self-judging reservation as severable from
the rest of the French declaration of acceptance. However, Judge Lauterpacht con-
cluded that such a course was not open to the Court since he regarded the reservation as
the essence of the French undertaking. He pointed out that the rapporteur of the
Committee for Foreign Affairs of the French Chamber had stated in relation to the self-
judging reservation that "the French sovereingty [sic] is not put in issue and its rights
are safeguarded in all spheres and in all circumstances." [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 58.
The Judge also said,
"As is well known, that particular limitation is, substantially a repetition of the formula
adopted, after considerable discussion, by the Senate of the United States of America in
giving its consent and advice to the acceptance, in 1946, of the Optional Clause [article
36, paragraph z, of the Statute of the Court] by that country. That instrument is not
before the Court and it would not be proper for me to comment upon it except to the
extent of noting that the reservation in question was included therein having regard to
the decisive importance attached to it and not withstanding the doubts, expressed in
various quarters, as to its consistency with the Statute." [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 57.
Judge Lauterpacht took substantially the same position in the later Interhandel Case,
[i959] I.C.J. Rep. 6, 196o DUKE L.J. 73. That case was a suit by Switzerland against
the United States, and the American government invoked its self-judging reservation.
The Court, however, found that the objection was "without object at the present stage
of the proceedings." Id. at 26, i96o DUKE L.J. at So. However, Judge Klaestad, by
then President of the Court, took the view in his dissent that, although the Court might
be prevented from acting upon the part of the United States' declaration which was in
conflict with the Statute of the Court, that is, upon the self-judging reservation, it would
not be impossible for the Court to give effect to the other parts of the declaration which
conformed to the Statute. Id. at 78, 296o DUKE L.J. at 82-83.
2' [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 46.
2
' In 1957, when the judgment in this case was rendered, six states other than France
had made self-judging reservations to their acceptances of the Court's compulsory juris-
diction. These were the United States, 61 Stat. izx8 (1946), [946-i947] I.C.J.Y.B.
2175 Mexico, [1947-1948] I.CJ.Y.B. 129; Liberia, [1951-1952] I.C.J.Y.B. 185;
Union of South Africa, [1955-1956] I.C.J.Y.B. 1845 India, [1955-i956] I.C.J.Y.B.
1865 and Pakistan, [1956-1957] I.C.J.Y.B. 219. After judgment in this case was ren-
dered, the Sudan accepted compulsory jurisdiction but appended a self-judging reserva-
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inclusion of the reservations was inadvertent. On the contrary, he be-
lieved that the authors of the self-judging reservations had the Statute
dearly before them and had deliberately disregarded it. He thus re-
jected any interpretation of the French declaration which would bring
it within "the four corners of conformity with the Statute. 2 7
Apart from the incompatibility of the French reservation and article
36 of the Statute of the Court, Judge Lauterpacht found a more general
reason for concluding that the declaration was invalid. He judged
that because the French government had reserved to itself the deter-
mination of jurisdiction in a declaration that purported to accept com-
pulsory jurisdiction, it had in effect reserved to itself the determination
of the very existence and extent of its obligation. Therefore, the decla-
ration lacked a condition essential to the validity of any legal obligation.
Although a declaration of acceptance is in fact a unilateral instrument,
Judge Lauterpacht reasoned that it was still necessary that it manifest
an intent to create respective rights and obligations if it was to be treated
as a legal text upon which the Court could base its jurisdiction. The
declaration might thus be regarded as an instrument of accession to a
multilateral treaty. In assuming this position, Judge Lauterpacht re-
sorted to a source of law which article 38 of the Statute denominates as
"the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."2, Thus,
he referred not only to the national law of France and Norway, but also
to American law when he declared that "the freedom of a party to
determine the object of its obligation is represented [by the American
commentator, Williston] 9 as negativing the legal nature of the agree-
tion. [1957-1958 ] I.C.J.Y.B. zoS. In 1959, France, [1958-I959] I.C.J.Y.B. z1z,
and India, 196o DUKE L.J. 86, submitted new declarations of acceptance from which
both countries omitted the self-judging reservation.
2" [19571 I.C.J. Rep. at 47.
28" 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states3
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59 [that the decisions of the Court are not subject
to the principal of stare decisis], judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo
et bono, if the parties agree thereto." STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 38.
2' "One of the commonest kind of promises too indefinite for legal enforcement is
where the promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of his
performance. This unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise and makes it merely
illusory." i WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 123-24 (rev. ed. 1936).
Vol. i 96o: 4 16]
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ment."30  This, the Judge felt, was no more than a principle of com-
mon sense.
Applied to the present case, that principle signifies that if the element of legal
obligation is non-existent or negligible it must follow that the instrument is not
a legal instrument upon which a State can rely as a matter of right for the
purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court.8 '
Having concluded that the French declaration was invalid, both
Judge Guerrero and Judge Lauterpacht expressed their desire to reverse
the trend toward self-judging reservations which was initiated by the
United States' declaration of acceptance in 1946. Judge Guerrero said
that the construction of article 36 which allowed reservations to be made
to the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was made under the in-
fluence of former members of the League of Nations which were con-
cerned with extending the movement toward international compulsory
jurisdiction that had developed before World War 11.82 He concluded
that the self-judging reservation was contrary to the spirit and purpose
of the Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United Nations. He
thus summarized his position: 3
It has rightly been said already that it is not possible to establish a system of
law if each State reserves to itself the power to decide itself what the law is.
The problem to be solved is, however, a simple one. It is, in fact, the problem
whether the unilateral will of one State or the common will of the Parties
before the Court can have priority over the collective will expressed in an in-
strument as important as the Statute of the Court.
NORWAY'S PURPOSE IN INVOKING THE SELF-JUDGING RESERVATION
In invoking the French self-judging reservation, Norway asserted,
"There can be no possible doubt on this point [that the subject of the
dispute was a matter of national rather than international law]. If,
1 [x957] I.C.J. Rep. at 50.
3' Ibid.
2 Of the over 2oo treaties considered in Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, X928-z948, (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 194 9. V, 3),
not more than six contain a right of unilateral determination of jurisdictional questions.
[1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 63. By way of contrast, Judge Lauterpacht pointed out that,
following the adoption of the self-judging reservation by the United States, similar
reservations have been made to other treaties which include provisions for international
judicial settlement of disputes. See, e.g., Economic Aid Agreement with the Republic
of China, July 3, 1948, art. XI, 6z Stat. 2945, T.I.A.S. No. 1837, 17 U.N.T.S. iiq;
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogati), April 30, 1948, [195x] 2
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 30 U.N.T.S. 55.
S1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 69.
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however, there should still be some doubt, the Norwegian Government
would rely upon the reservations made by the French Govern-
ment ... .4 Except for this, the French reservation was not again
discussed by Norway in either the pleadings or the oral proceedings.
This led four of the Judges" to conclude that Norway's invocation of
the self-judging reservation was subsidiary to the primary ground of
its first preliminary objection concerning the national character of the
dispute. Therefore, the Court should not have reached the subsidiary
ground of objection until it had disposed of the primary ground.
Vice President Badawi pointed out that it is characteristic of a sub-
sidiary request for judgment that it carries a greater degree of certainty
than the main request. Here, Norway maintained that the dispute was
a matter of national rather than international law, which is a question
for the Court. Following this, Norway invoked the French self-judging
reservation, which called for a determination of the jurisdictional ques-
tion by Norway alone, and was, therefore, certain to produce a result
favorable to Norway.
Judge Lauterpacht, however, felt that the majority had misinter-
preted the intent of Norway's first preliminary objection. He charac-
terized Norway's contention that the dispute was a matter of national
law as "principal" and "substantive," as opposed to its invocation of the
self-judging reservation which was "subsidiary" and "formal.130  Be-
cause Norway's principal purpose in the proceedings before the Court
had been to establish the correctness of its primary ground of objection,
Judge Lauterpacht reasoned that the Court should have considered that
objection because "a Party to proceedings before the Court is entitled to
expect that its Judgment shall give as accurate a picture as possible of
the basic aspects of the legal position adopted by that Party. '37  The
question whether the dispute was governed by national or international
law was one which had divided the parties for years and was of "con-
siderable interest for international law.' 3' The function of the Court,
therefore, was to answer that question rather than to select the ground
which the majority regarded as "more direct and conclusive. 3 9
Id. at 72. (Emphasis added.)
They were Vice President Badawi and Judges Basdevant, Lauterpacht, and Read.
"Id. at 35.
7 Id. at 36.
28 Ibid.
" "The Courts competence is chalenged on both grounds and the Court is free to
base its decision on the ground which in its judgment is more direct and conclusive."
Id. at 25.
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While Judges Basdevant and Read agreed with Vice President
Badawi and Judge Lauterpacht that the Norwegian invocation of the
self-judging reservation was a subsidiary objection, they also concluded
that the majority had misconstrued the import of Norway's objection.
Judge Basdevant presumed that a government could invoke the reser-
vation in so categorical a fashion that that government's opinion as to
the domestic character of the dispute would preclude the Court's juris-
diction even without the Court's considering the issue, but he was hesi-
tant to ascribe to Norway "such a responsibility, political and moral, not
only vis-d-vis the other Party before the Court in the present dispute
but in a more general manner and by such a precedent, before the
United Nations .... 24o Norway's true position, as conceived by Judge
Basdevant, was more "moderate" 4' in that the reservation had been
invoked only in the event that the Court was reluctant to accept what
Norway regarded as its irrefutable contention that the dispute was
solely a matter of national law. Moreover, Norway had contended
that,4
2
such a reservation must be interpreted in good faith and should a Government
seek to rely upon it with a view to denying the jurisdiction of the Court in a
case which manifestly did not involve a "matter which is essentially within the
national jurisdiction" it would be committing an abus de droit which would
not prevent the Court from acting.
This, Judge Basdevant apprehended, was a recognition by Norway
of the Court's power to control the invocation of the self-judging reser-
vation, a conclusion which he found to be supported by the careful
attention which Norway gave to buttressing its primary contention that
the dispute was national rather than international in character.
Finally, Judge Basdevant determined that Norway could not have
intended its invocation of the French reservation as a categorical denial
of the Court's jurisdiction because of the existing international law
between Norway and France. Both countries had acceded to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
for which the International Court of Justice was substituted by article
37 of the Statute.43  The French declaration of accession to the juris-
1d. at 7z .
41 Ibid.
1. at 73.
48 "Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to
a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute,
be referred to the International Court of Justice." STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 37.
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diction of the old Court applied to disputes "other than those which the
Permanent Court of International Justice may recognize as bearing on
a question left by the international law to the exclusive competence of
the State.144 As in the instant case, Norway was entitled to rely upon
the French accession to the jurisdiction of the old Court by virtue of the
principle of reciprocity. Under that accession, disputes within the exclu-
sive competence of the state were reserved from the Court's jurisdiction.
That reservation, however, was qualified by the requirement that such
disputes were to be defined by the old Court according to the principles
of international law. The French self-judging reservation to the juris-
diction of the present Court was, of course, broader in scope than the
former reservation, but, because the present declaration was unilateral,
it could not serve to modify the law already in force between France
and Norway.
A way of access to the Court was opened up by the accession of the two
Parties to the General Act of 1928. It could not be closed or cancelled out by
the restrictive clause which the French Government, and not the Norwegian
Government, added to its fresh acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction stated
in its Declaration of 1949. The restrictive clause, emanating from only
one of them, does not constitute the law as between France and Norway.45
Thus, Judge Basdevant concluded, Norway could have invoked the
French reservation only in the light of the law existing between the
two states-that is, only as to a dispute recognized by international law
as one within the domestic jurisdiction of the state as adjudged by the
Court. It was in this sense that Norway invoked the self-judging
reservation. Although it would have been in Norway's interest to con-
fer a categorical character upon the self-judging reservation, Judge
Basdevant thought that she had not done so "because she was anxious
to respect her international obligations. ' 46
Judge Read concurred with Judge Basdevant's view that, although
Norway had invoked the self-judging reservation, it had done so only
in the belief that the Court could control the exercise of the reservation
by examining the good faith of the invoking party. He observed, how-
ever, that it would be impractical for the Court to examine a dispute on
the basis of the good or bad faith of the parties. The basic principle of
the Norwegian position was correct, but the true meaning of the French
" [-957] I.C.J. Rep. at 75.
"5 Ibid. Judge Basdevant relied on Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J.,
ser. A/B, No. 77, at 76 (1939).
" 957] I.C.J. Rep. at 74.
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reservation was that a government, by invoking the self-judging reserva-
tion, "understands," and not merely "pretends to understand" or "de-
dares that it understands," that the dispute was essentially within its
national jurisdiction.4 7 The reservation, then, properly construed, means
that the invoking state "must establish that there is a genuine under-
standing, i.e. that the circumstances are such that it would be reasonably
possible to reach the understanding that the dispute was essentially
national."4" The question whether these circumstances exist is for the
Court. Any construction of the self-judging reservation that gave to a
respondent state an arbitrary power to settle any jurisdictional question
would lead to an absurdity, according to Judge Read, because such a
power would, of course, be contrary to article 36, paragraph 6, of the
Statute of the Court. 9 According to accepted canons of interpretation,"
such a result must be avoided if the words in their context can be con-
strued to avoid it. Here, the majority of the Court, in Judge Read's
opinion, failed to recognize that the words "as understood" in the
French reservation, "connote a real understanding, and not a fictitious
understanding unrelated to the facts."51
WAS THE DISPUTE SUBJECT To NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The French application to the Court requested judgment that Nor-
way was obligated to discharge its debt on the loan contracts in gold
rather than in the existing Norwegian currency. In its final submissions,
France also requested judgment that Norway pay foreign bondholders
without discrimination as to their nationality and that Norway could not,
47 Id. at 94.8 Ibid. Judge Lauterpacht, however, pointed out that, "Practically every aspect of
the conduct of the State may be, prima facie, within that category [essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction] for the reason that normally the State exercises its activity
within its national territory . . . .For these reasons it is possible for a State to main-
tain, without necessarily laying itself open to an irresistible charge of bad faith, that
practically every dispute concerns a matter essentially within its domestic jurisdiction."
Id. at 51-Sz. He had earlier expressed a view that, to the extent that the self-judging
reservation must be invoked in good faith, a valid legal obligation is created. Lauterpacht,
Report on the Law of Treaties, International Law Commission, U.N. Doe. No. A/CN. 4 /
63 (1953). In his opinion in the instant case, Judge Lauterpacht expressly repudiated
his earlier view. [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 5z.
See supra, p. 4z3.
co "It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the
sense which they would normally have in their context, unless such interpretation would
lead to something unreasonable or absurd." Polish Postal Service in Danzig, P.C.I.J.,
ser. B, No. ii, at 39 (2gzs). This rule was approved by the present Court in Compe-
tence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, [195o] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 8.
S[957] I.C.J. Rep. at 95.
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by unilateral national legislation, modify the rights of French bond-
holders under the loan contracts.52 On the other hand, as has been
noted, Norway contended throughout the proceedings that the subject
of the dispute was a matter of national law rather than international
law and in its first preliminary objection, the government requested that
the Court refuse to hear the case for this reason.
Among those Judges who wrote separate or dissenting opinions,
only Vice President Badawi adopted the Norwegian contention that the
dispute was governed by national law.53 He declared that the general
rule of private international law is that the construction of loan con-
tracts is governed by the law of the debtor state. The French govern-
ment maintained that the dispute fell within article 36, paragraph 2(b),
of the Statute of the Court, concerning questions of international law,
'2 Norway objected to these two requests on the ground that they gave rise to a new
claim. It is the practice of the Court to permit parties to modify their submissions
(pleadings) up to the end of the oral proceedings. The right to do so, however, is
subject to two limitations, according to Judge Read. First, "when there is an appre-
ciable change, the other Party must have a fair opportunity to comment on the amended
Submissions." Id. at 8o-8S. Since the final submissions of France were made at the
close of its opening statement, he concluded that the first limitation had been satisfied.
"The second condition is that the amendment must be an amendment. It must not
consist of an attempt by the Applicant Government to bring a new and different dispute
before the Court." Id. at Si. Judge Read noted that article 40 of the Statute of the
Court requires that the application set forth the "subject of the dispute and the par-
ties. . .. "1 On the other hand, definition of issues by submissions is to be done in the
course of the written and oral proceedings as required by article 48. Inasmuch as the
application in the present case revealed that the case was intended to relate to the dispute
which had been at issue between France and Norway for thirty years, and because Judge
Read's review of the history of the dispute revealed that the issues of discrimination and
extraterritorial legislation had been in controversy between the parties during those
thirty years, he therefore concluded that the final French submissions did not give rise
to a new claim. Moreover, Judge Read found that, even if the application was limited
to the effect of the gold clause in the bonds, the responsibility for the introduction of
the two new issues was "mainly due to Norway. [Or,] at any rate, Norway certainly
shared that responsibility with France." Id. at 85.
Vice President Badawi pointed out that the French application raised only the ques-
tion of the interpretation of the loan contracts, a question of national law. The questions
concerning discrimination and extraterritorial legislation were raised only in the course
of the French oral reply to the Norwegian defense that Norway's laws did not work a
denial of justice. "[lit would be very strange, and even paradoxical, to consider that
the denial of the international character of a question of municipal law and the discussion
entered into in that connection confer on that very question an international character."
Id. at 33.
"Judge Moreno Quintana, in a one-paragraph declaration, stated that he agreed
with the Court's disposition of the case but that he based his decision on the primary
ground of Norway's first preliminary objection. "State loans, as being acts of sover-
eignty, are governed by muncipal law." Id. at z8.
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because of the operation of the Second Hague Convention of October 18,
1907, relating to arbitration of specified disputes, including international
loans.54  The Vice President determined, however, that the convention
did not make arbitration of loan disputes mandatory in all circumstances,
and that, even if it did, that fact could not transform the character of
the dispute from one of national to international law. Even assuming
that the convention required arbitration in all cases, the question before
the Court would not then be the interpretation of the loan contracts but,
rather, the breach by Norway of its presumed obligation to submit to
arbitration.55 Vice President Badawi also rejected the French contention
that the dispute was subsumed under article 36, paragraph 2(c), which
deals with "the existence of any fact which, if established, would consti-
tute a breach of international obligation." The underlying assumption
of this provision is that the parties are agreed on the international obli-
gation but that they disagree over the facts which constitute a breach
thereof. According to international law, national laws "are merely
facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States."5 0
Thus, in this case, if the application of Norwegian law were treated as a
question of fact, the Court would have to assume that the parties were
agreed that under international law a state might not cancel a gold
clause applicable to international payments. Of course, said Vice Presi-
dent Badawi, "Norway disputes the alleged rule of international law.
This is the very basis of the present case." 7
Judge Lauterpacht agreed with Vice President Badawi that Nor-
wegian law governed the interpretation of the loan contracts, but he
found that it was the very application of Norwegian law which France
maintained was contrary to international law. Any national law may
conflict with international law in its intent or effect, and the question of
conflict between national legislation and international law is itself a ques-
tion of international law.
"' Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Second Hague
Convention), Oct. 1S, 1907, ioo British and Foreign State Papers 298. Article 53 of
the Convention refers to disputes "arising from contract debts claimed from one Power
by another Power as due its nationals" as suitable for arbitration. "The second para-
graph of Article I . . . does indeed refer to arbitration, but not for the purpose of
imposing upon the State charged as a debtor an obligation to arbitrate, its purpose is
merely to limit the undertaking not to resort to force." [1957] I.C.J. Rep. at 31.
" Judge Badawi referred to the Ambatielos Case, [1953] I.C.J. Rep. to.
" [957] I.C.J. at 32. Judge Badawi relied on Case Concerning the Payment of
Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7o (g99), and on Case
Concerning the Payment in Gold of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France,
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. zi (i9±9).
" ['957] I.C.J. Rep. at 32.
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The notion that if a matter is governed by national law it is for that reason at
the same time outside the sphere of international law is both novel and, if
accepted, subversive of international law. It is not enough for a State to bring
a matter under the protective umbrella of its legislation, possibly of a predatory
character, in order to shelter it effectively from any control by international
law. There may be little difference between a Government breaking unlaw-
fully a contract with an alien and a Government causing legislation to be
enacted which makes it impossible for it to comply with the contract.58
Although he acquiesced in Vice President Badawi's conclusion that
the question of Norway's obligation to pay the bonds in gold was one
of national law, Judge Read, nevertheless, rejected Norway's first pre-
liminary objection.50 He noted two requests for judgment by France
which did not directly relate to the interpretation of the alleged gold
payment obligation. The first was that Norway could not discriminate
in payments by giving preferential treatment to some non-Norwegian
bondholders, and denying it to the French bondholders. Norway had
favored Danish and Swedish bondholders in making payments on the
bonds,60 but it argued that this had been done as a matter of good will
toward the other Scandinavian countries,' that, at any rate, it was a
matter of grace as to which France had no right to complain, and,
finally, that it was justified by the exigencies of the world-wide depres-
sion which compelled states to pass legislation impairing debtors' obli-
18 Id. at 37. judge Basdevant, who also voted to reject Norway's first preliminary
objection, agreed with Judge Lauterpacht on this point. The question presented by the
instant case involved such problems of international law as treatment by a state of
property rights of aliens, the equality of treatment of aliens and nationals, and of resi-
dent aliens and aliens resident abroad, and discrimination between French bondholders
and other non-Norwegian bondholders.
"' France contended that the adoption by the French government of the French bond-
holders' claim and the refusal of Norway to permit payment of the bonds and coupons
in gold "transformed this dispute from one between private individuals and the Nor-
wegian borrowers into one between France and Norway .... " Judge Read rejected
this contention. "[Slomething more is needed than the mere adoption of a dispute
under the national law to give rise to a 'question of international law' within the mean-
ing of ... [article 36, paragraph 2(b) of the Statute of the Court]. There must have
been a breach by Norway of an obligation under international law due to France." Id.
at 87.
60 The report of the judgment did not make clear just what the discriminatory prac-
tice was, but it appears that Norway had paid the Danish and Swedish bondholders in
Swedish crowns while ignoring a compromise request by France that the French bond-
holders be paid in Swedish crowns on their capital payments and in Norwegian crowns
on the coupons. Id. at 88.
"x Judge Read said that the 'meaning and significance [of this defence] are still
obscure." Id. at 89.
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gations. Judge Read considered that the question whether international
law contained any rule forbidding discriminatory treatment of foreign
creditors was obviously a question of international law and necessarily
included all of the justifications which Norway had advanced. Secondly,
France requested judgment that, according to international law, Nor-
way could not by unilateral legislation modify the rights of French bond-
holders. France argued that the marketing of bonds on foreign markets
created obligations arising under international law as well as national
law and that there was a broad principle of international law forbidding
a state to enact extraterritorial legislation impairing the contractual
rights of nonresident aliens. Norway contested both of these arguments
on the ground that they did not reflect the actual practice of states.
Judge Read concluded, "It will thus be seen that the French claim and
the Norwegian justification in this aspect of the question are both based
upon considerations of international law ....1,12
EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
Judge Read also rejected Norway's fourth preliminary objection"3
that the French bondholders had not exhausted remedies available to
them in the Norwegian courts. In his opinion, the requirement of in-
ternational law that local remedies be exhausted before resort is had to
international tribunals serves two functions: first, the international tri-
bunal is provided with the ruling of local courts on the facts and local
law before it deals with the international aspects of the problem; second,
the respondent state, charged with a breach of international law, is
allowed a fair chance to rectify its position. Judge Read was convinced,
however, that resort by the French bondholders to the Norwegian
courts would have been futile because the Norwegian government had
repeatedly declared since 1925 that the Norwegian law of 1923 pre-
cluded payment in gold. In the oral proceedings, Norway suggested
that the bondholders might have persuaded the Norwegian courts that
the law was inapplicable to foreigners or that it was unconstitutional
because of its retroactive character. Judge Read rejected this contention,
however, on the ground that the French bondholders had no way of
knowing of these possibilities in the face of the Norwegian govern-
2 1d. at 91.
3 4. The holders of bond certificates on whose behalf the French Government
considers itself entitled to institute international proceedings have not previously ex-
hausted the local remedies, .. " Id. at x4. See The Interhandel Case, [1959] I.CJ.
Rep. 6, 196o DUKE L.J. 73, So, in which the United States successfully raised a similar
objection.
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ment's insistence during the diplomatic negotiations that it was powerless
under the law to meet the bondholders' demands.
Judge Lauterpacht felt, however, that the possibility of a Norwegian
judgment in favor of the bondholders was sufficient to require that they
resort to the Norwegian courts.64 He pointed to the trend of some
national courts to interpret national legislation, wherever possible, as
not to impute to the local law the intention or effect to violate interna-
tional law. The Judge was also concerned that France had presented no
satisfactory explanation for the failure of the bondholders to resort to
Norwegian courts during the several decades that the dispute had lasted.
Upon these grounds, Judge Lauterpacht, "with some hesitation,""6 de-
cided that the fourth preliminary objection was well-founded.
"' Judge Lauterpacht refused to attach any "decisive importance" to the view that
the Norwegian government's repeated insistence that it was prevented by Norwegian law
from paying in gold entitled the French bondholders to assume that they had no remedy
under Norwegian law. "The Norwegian Government, being an interested party, was
not for this purpose an authorised interpreter of Norwegian law. It was for the bond-
holders, by bringing an action before Norwegian courts, to attempt to show that the
Norwegian Government was mistaken in its interpretation of Norwegian law. If the
courts held that the interpretation was correct, then the road to international proceedings
would no longer be blocked by the objection based on the failure to exhaust local
remedies." [x957] I.C.J. Rep. at 41.
" Ibid.
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